| Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 973992 | The North American Journal of Economics and Finance | 2016 | 14 Pages |
Abstract
This paper explores the relation between management forecasts and expensive perquisites. We investigate Yermack's (2006) conjecture that managers withhold bad news in order to receive expensive perquisites. We provide direct evidence supporting Yermack's (2006) conjecture. The frequency and magnitude of bad news release is greater than that of good news after the chief executive officer (CEO) first discloses aircraft perks. In addition, managers with greater numbers of disclosed perks are more inclined to withhold bad news. Additional subsample analyses provide further support for managerial bad news withholding behavior.
Related Topics
Social Sciences and Humanities
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Economics and Econometrics
Authors
Chia-Wei Huang, Chih-Yen Lin,