Cooperative behavior in evolutionary snowdrift game with bounded rationality

An evolutionary snowdrift game (SG) that incorporates bounded rationality and limited information in the evolutionary process is proposed and studied. Based on SG in a well-mixed population and defining the winning action at a turn to be the one that gets a higher payoff, the most recent mm winning actions can be used as a public information based on which the competing agents decide their next actions. This defines a strategy pool from which each agent picks a number of strategies as their tool in adapting to the competing environment. The payoff parameter rr in SG serves to set the maximum number of winners per turn. Due to the bounded rationality and limited information, the cooperative frequency shows steps and plateaux as a function of rr and these features tend to be smoothed out as mm increases. These features are results of an interplay between a restricted subset of mm-bit histories that the system can visit at a value of rr and the limited capacity that agents can adapt. The standard deviation in the number of agents taking the cooperative action is also studied. For general values of rr, our model generates a realization of the binary-agent-resource model. The idea of introducing bounded rationality into a two-person game to realize the minority game or binary-agent-resource model could be a useful tool for future research.