Economic Interdependence and National Security: The India-Pakistan Case

In this paper, the main goal is to contribute to the debate, which concerns the interaction of economic interdependence between rival states. So far, this debate was between Liberals and Neo-Marxist, whose argument was that trade promotes peace, for the former, and that asymmetric trade creates either conflictual relations or more cooperation, according to the balance of power. This paper is built on the theoretical basis of Realism and more specifically, on Gilpin's approach of international political economy. By developing a new analytical framework, which consists of determinants such as the geographic specificity and worthiness of the disputed area, meaning the added value the conflictual area gives to the state's influence and therefore to its power, we examine the case of conflict between India and Pakistan, arguing that trade, commercial relations and economic interdependence, in general, does not deter conflict or militarized disputes, because states’ dominant objective is not the economic growth and prosperity but the access to areas which provide them with more possibilities of exercising their influence, through economic or other means. We conclude, that economic interdependence does not promote peaceful relations between adversaries, since conflict is not eliminated, and for that reason, a potential reduce of conflict levels or militarized disputes provides a sense of virtual national security.