Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
984510 | Research in Economics | 2007 | 9 Pages |
Abstract
This paper analyses the effects of altruistic parental transfers on the welfare gains of marriage. To that end, it develops a sequential game which, in a first stage, determines the optimum level of the transfer between the altruistic donor (the parent) and the recipient (the daughter/son). In the second stage, the levels of consumption and provision of a family good are deduced by way of a Nash bargaining solution, with the threat point being represented by divorce. We find that the degree of altruism of the recipient has a null effect on the gains in welfare derived from the marriage by the recipient's spouse, and a positive effect on those derived by the recipient. Additionally, the degree of altruism of the donor has a positive effect on the gains in welfare derived from the marriage by the recipient's spouse, and an ambiguous effect on those derived by the recipient.
Related Topics
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Economics and Econometrics
Authors
JoaquÃn Andaluz, José Alberto Molina,