Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
985201 | Resource and Energy Economics | 2007 | 19 Pages |
Abstract
Political pressure often exists for rebating environmental levies, particularly when incomplete regulatory coverage allegedly creates an “unlevel playing field” with other, unregulated firms or industries. This paper assesses the conditions under which rebating environmental levies is justified for the regulated sector, combining a theoretical approach with numerical simulations parameterized to reflect the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative. Rebates are undesired if one can instead tax the production of the unregulated sector. Otherwise, rebating is justified only when the goods of the competing sectors are close substitutes with similar emissions profiles. Policy constraints are costly in terms of welfare and environmental effectiveness.
Keywords
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Physical Sciences and Engineering
Energy
Energy (General)
Authors
Alain L. Bernard, Carolyn Fischer, Alan K. Fox,