Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
985715 | Review of Economic Dynamics | 2008 | 29 Pages |
Abstract
In a simple search model of money, we study a special kind of memory which gives rise to an arrangement resembling a payment network. Specifically, we assume that agents can pay a cost to have access to a central data base that keeps track of payments made and received. Incentives must be provided to agents to access the central data base and to produce when they have access to this arrangement. We study policies that can relax these incentive constraints. In particular, we show that a ‘no-surcharge’ rule has good incentive properties. Finally, we compare our model with the model of Cavalcanti and Wallace.
Related Topics
Social Sciences and Humanities
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Economics and Econometrics
Authors
Antoine Martin, Michael J. Orlando, David Skeie,