Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
986098 | Review of Financial Economics | 2007 | 24 Pages |
Abstract
We develop a model focusing on the dynamic aspect of syndication, namely, the know-how transfer between syndication partners and their ability to learn. The core of the analysis checks whether reputational concerns outweigh the temptation to renege on a given contract. Throughout the paper, we investigate two key topics. The first consists of the conditions under which investors syndicate their deals. The second focuses on who chooses whom. Sometimes, the syndication is impeded because the financier believes that his partner has strong incentives to either renege on a contract (hold-up problem) or to shirk (moral hazard problem).
Keywords
Related Topics
Social Sciences and Humanities
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Economics and Econometrics
Authors
Tereza Tykvová,