Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
989955 | World Development | 2006 | 20 Pages |
Abstract
SummaryThe success of efforts to decentralize governance responsibilities hinges upon the incentives of local politicians. We test this argument by studying the experiences of forestry sector decentralization in Bolivia and Guatemala. We analyze the survey responses of 200 mayors and show that local-level institutional incentives are systematically linked to variations in local politicians’ interest and investment decisions in the forestry sector. Further, we find that a decentralization policy that transfers very limited decision-making powers to local governments stifles local interest in organizing resource governance activities.
Related Topics
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Economics and Econometrics
Authors
Krister P. Andersson, Clark C. Gibson, Fabrice Lehoucq,