Bidders’ gains and family control of private target firms

This paper examines the announcement returns of bidders acquiring private firms owned by families versus the returns of bidders acquiring non-family controlled private firms. The sample consists of 391 acquisitions of private targets in seven continental European countries for the period 1997–2008. We find evidence that bidder's cumulative announcement returns (CARs) are lower when they acquire family controlled targets compared to non-family controlled targets. We show that this result holds regardless of whether the deal is paid with shares or cash and whether or not the bidding firm is also privately owned. Moreover, the result is independent of the size of the acquisition relative to the size of the acquiring firm. Our findings are consistent with the notion that the bidder has to pay a higher price in order to convince the family owners to sell in return for giving up private benefits.

► We examine the announcement returns (CARs) of bidders acquiring private targets by focusing on whether target firms are family-controlled or not. ► CARs are lower when bidders acquire family-controlled targets. ► The main result holds regardless of whether the deal is paid with shares or cash and whether or not the bidding firm is also privately owned. ► The conclusion is that the bidder has to pay a higher price in order to convince the family owners to sell in return for giving up private benefits.