Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
1006721 | Research in Accounting Regulation | 2012 | 9 Pages |
We investigate the economic trade-offs managers face due to conflicting incentives to report high financial statement book income and, at the same time, report low taxable income. Our setting involves Houston clients of Arthur Andersen (AA), who have been shown to exhibit a culture of aggressive financial reporting. Using our sample of AA Houston clients, we test two competing theories: (1) firms which have a culture of aggressive financial reporting are also aggressive in their tax reporting, versus (2) firms which are willing to pay real dollars (taxes) to report higher financial statement earnings. We do not find support for either theory. Instead, our findings suggest a middle-ground: firms may exhibit a culture of aggressive financial reporting without impacting their relative tax reporting. Our findings not only shed light on the intersection of financial and tax reporting, but they also add to the extant literature involving the culture of AA. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to investigate the tax ramifications of AA’s culture of aggressive financial reporting.