Delivery leadtime and channel structure decisions for make-to-order duopoly under different game scenarios

•We study the delivery leadtime and channel structure decisions of make-to-order duopoly.•We explore the interactions between channel structure decision and the price-leadtime decisions.•We identify the conditions of asymmetric/symmetric channel structure equilibrium.•Both firms use decentralization when leadtime cost and price elasticity are small.•The effect of decentralization on quoted leadtime largely depends on the pricing power scenario.

We develop game-theoretic models to explore the quoted delivery leadtime, price, and channel structure decisions for a make-to-order duopoly system under three game scenarios. Under the integrated-manufacturer first scenario, we find that (i) decentralization of the supply chain increases quoted leadtime; and (ii) both manufacturers may choose different channel structures under symmetric duopoly. By comparing with the symmetric scenario and the retailer first scenario, we find that a manufacturer facing a decentralized rival adopts decentralization when leadtime sensitivity, leadtime cost, and price elasticity are very small; the effect of decentralization on quoted leadtime largely depends on game scenario.