US shipping initial public offerings: Do prospectus and market information matter?

This paper examines the extent that public information, available prior to the initial public offering of shipping companies, is only partially incorporated in the final offer price. The sample includes shipping US initial public offerings that took place in the period 1987–2008, and the analysis employs a set of IPO, market, and firm specific characteristics. Our findings have both theoretical and empirical implications for shipping IPOs, and indicate that there is no asymmetry of information between participants in shipping IPOs. On the theoretical part, the partial adjustment theory of Benveniste and Spindt (1989) is supported, whereas the winner’s curse theory of Rock (1986) is rejected. On the empirical side, the probability of underpricing can be predicted by employing variables available to all IPO participants prior to the issue.

► The relationship between public available information and underpricing of shipping US IPOs is investigated. ► No asymmetric information is found between participants in shipping US IPOs. ► The partial adjustment theory is supported, whereas the winner’s curse theory is rejected. ► We show the importance of market conditions, gearing and operating efficiency when predicting underpricing of shipping IPOs.