Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
1023824 | Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review | 2011 | 9 Pages |
Abstract
This paper analyzes a non-congested private airport that possesses market power in providing aeronautical services. We find that the profit-maximizing landing fee decreases in the degree of complementarity of aviation and non-aviation. Furthermore, our model implies that airports will not take advantage of their market power if non-aviation revenues, or the degree of complementarity of aviation and non-aviation, exceed a critical threshold. In this case, a dual-till regulation will be unnecessary. A single-till regulation, on the other hand, will always result in lower landing fees than laissez-faire.
Keywords
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Authors
Uwe Kratzsch, Gernot Sieg,