Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
10328974 | Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science | 2005 | 24 Pages |
Abstract
Covert channels are information leaks in systems that use resources to transfer secretly a message. They are a threat for security, performance, but also for a system's profitability. This paper proposes a new approach to detect covert channels from scenario models of protocols. The problem of finding covert channels in scenarios is first modeled as a game, in which a pair of malicious users {S,R} is trying to transfer information while the rest of the protocol tries to prevent it. The messages transferred are encoded by behavioral choices at some precise moments, and decoded by a transducer whose input vocabulary is an observation of the system. We then characterize the presence of a covert channel as the existence of a winning strategy for {S,R} and of a decoder.
Related Topics
Physical Sciences and Engineering
Computer Science
Computational Theory and Mathematics
Authors
Loïc Hélouët, Marc Zeitoun, Aldric Degorre,