Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
10337854 | Ad Hoc Networks | 2005 | 27 Pages |
Abstract
This paper focuses on the formal assessment of the properties of cooperation enforcement mechanisms used to detect and prevent selfish behavior of nodes forming a mobile ad hoc network. In the first part, we demonstrate the requirement for a cooperation enforcement mechanism using cooperative game theory that allows us to determine a lower bound on the size of coalitions of cooperating nodes. In the second part, using non-cooperative game theory, we compare our cooperation enforcement mechanism CORE to other popular mechanisms. Under the hypothesis of perfect monitoring of node behavior, CORE appears to be equivalent to a wide range of history-based strategies like tit-for-tat. Further, adopting a more realistic assumption taking into account imperfect monitoring due to probable communication errors, the non-cooperative model puts in evidence the superiority of CORE over other history-based schemes.
Related Topics
Physical Sciences and Engineering
Computer Science
Computer Networks and Communications
Authors
Pietro Michiardi, Refik Molva,