Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
10475985 | Journal of Financial Economics | 2005 | 42 Pages |
Abstract
Does the level of integration of a firm affect the quality of information available to its top decision makers responsible for allocating resources? Motivated by the pervasiveness of specific knowledge in large multi-division firms, I develop a model of internal competition for corporate resources among specialist managers and show that: (i) managers of integrated firms exaggerate the payoffs of their projects to obtain resources despite potentially adverse career consequences, and (ii) the exaggeration problem worsens with increased integration and reduces the allocative efficiency of an integrated firm. Control rights based on asset ownership enable the firm to set “the rules of the game” and improve managerial behavior through organizational processes such as rigid capital budgets, job rotation, centralization and hierarchies.
Related Topics
Social Sciences and Humanities
Business, Management and Accounting
Accounting
Authors
Oguzhan Ozbas,