Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
10476257 | Journal of Financial Intermediation | 2005 | 22 Pages |
Abstract
We analyze the impact of takeover threats on long-term relationships between the target owners and other stakeholders. In the absence of takeovers, stakeholders' bargaining power increases their incentive to invest but reduces the owners' incentive to invest. The threat of a takeover that would transfer value from the stakeholders reduces their ex ante investment. However, the stakeholders may appropriate ex post some value created by a takeover. This can prevent some value-enhancing takeovers. We examine extensions to the disciplinary role of takeovers, takeover defense mechanisms, and trade credit, and discuss empirical predictions.
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Authors
Gilles Chemla,