| Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 11005131 | Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review | 2018 | 19 Pages |
Abstract
This paper analyses the game relationship between port authorities and ship owners under the new inspection regime (NIR). Based on 49328 inspection reports from Paris Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) (2015-2017), we present a Bayesian Network (BN) model to determine vessel detention rates after adding company performance as a new indicator in PSC inspection. A strategic game model is formulated by incorporating the BN model outcomes. The optimal inspection rate from the game model can help improve port authority performance in PSC. An empirical study is conducted to illustrate the insights of the results and provide suggestions for port authorities.
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Authors
Zhisen Yang, Zaili Yang, Jingbo Yin, Zhuohua Qu,