Article ID Journal Published Year Pages File Type
261599 Design Studies 2014 31 Pages PDF
Abstract

•Farrell & Hooker have challenged the conventional science–design distinction.•Thorough conceptual clarification of the science–design relationship is called for.•An analysis of Farrell & Hooker's arguments shows them to be unconvincing.•A plausible conception of design versus science is proposed for clarification.•Several arguments in defence of the science–design distinction are developed.

Recently, Robert Farrell and Cliff Hooker opposed the conventional view that ‘design and science are distinct types of intellectual study and production’, claiming that science and design ‘are not different in kind’, and explicitly challenging proponents of the conventional view to ‘provide explicit arguments’ in its defence. This calls for an in-depth conceptual clarification of the science–design relationship. The aims of the present paper are to take up the gauntlet thrown by Farrell and Hooker, and in so doing, to provide such a clarification. We first analyse Farrell & Hooker's arguments, explaining why we find them unconvincing. We then propose a plausible conception of design versus science, and offer several arguments for considering design and science distinct, albeit related, concepts.

Related Topics
Physical Sciences and Engineering Computer Science Computer Graphics and Computer-Aided Design
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