| Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 400139 | International Journal of Electrical Power & Energy Systems | 2008 | 5 Pages |
Abstract
This work presents a mathematical model to aid a price-taker seller who offers in a bilateral electricity contract auction. The buyers’ demand for electricity is disputed by multiple sellers in a descending, sealed-bid auction, with multiple products, uniform price for each product, and multiple rounds. The model efficiently allocates the seller’s offers into the auctioned products, maximizing his financial benefit. It was developed for auctions with the same rules of the Brazilian Purchase Auction, a sequence of eleven-monthly auctions that happened from July-03 to June-04.
Related Topics
Physical Sciences and Engineering
Computer Science
Artificial Intelligence
Authors
Fernando C. Munhoz, Paulo B. Correia,