Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
418700 | Discrete Applied Mathematics | 2014 | 6 Pages |
Abstract
We consider the many-to-many two-sided matching problem under a stringent domain restriction on preferences called the max–min criterion. We show that, even under this restriction, there is no stable mechanism that is weakly Pareto efficient, strategy-proof, or monotonic (i.e., respects improvements) for agents on one side of the market. These results imply in particular that three of the main results of Baïou and Balinski (2000) are incorrect. We also show that one of the results of Baïou and Balinski (2007) is incorrect as well.
Related Topics
Physical Sciences and Engineering
Computer Science
Computational Theory and Mathematics
Authors
John William Hatfield, Fuhito Kojima, Yusuke Narita,