Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
427103 | Information Processing Letters | 2015 | 7 Pages |
Abstract
•We analyze the security of Camellia in the impossible differential context.•We improve the complexity of the impossible differential attacks on 12 rounds of Camellia-192 and 14 rounds of Camellia-256.•We present the first attack on 13 rounds of Camellia-192.
In this paper, we study the security of the block ciphers Camellia-192 and Camellia-256 in the impossible differential context. In particular, we present the first attack on 13 rounds of Camellia-192 with FL/FL−1FL/FL−1 layers. An attack on 14 rounds of Camellia-256 requiring less complexity than the previous impossible differential attacks is also described.
Keywords
Related Topics
Physical Sciences and Engineering
Computer Science
Computational Theory and Mathematics
Authors
Céline Blondeau,