Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
429995 | Journal of Computer and System Sciences | 2015 | 14 Pages |
Abstract
We analyze the Brandenburger–Keisler paradox in epistemic game theory, which is a ‘two-person version of Russell's paradox’. Our aim is to understand how it relates to standard one-person arguments, and why the ‘believes–assumes’ modality used in the argument arises. We recast it as a fixpoint result, which can be carried out in any regular category, and show how it can be reduced to a relational form of the one-person diagonal argument due to Lawvere. We give a compositional account, which leads to simple multi-agent generalizations. We also outline a general coalgebraic approach to the construction of assumption-complete models.
Keywords
Related Topics
Physical Sciences and Engineering
Computer Science
Computational Theory and Mathematics
Authors
Samson Abramsky, Jonathan Zvesper,