Article ID Journal Published Year Pages File Type
429995 Journal of Computer and System Sciences 2015 14 Pages PDF
Abstract

We analyze the Brandenburger–Keisler paradox in epistemic game theory, which is a ‘two-person version of Russell's paradox’. Our aim is to understand how it relates to standard one-person arguments, and why the ‘believes–assumes’ modality used in the argument arises. We recast it as a fixpoint result, which can be carried out in any regular category, and show how it can be reduced to a relational form of the one-person diagonal argument due to Lawvere. We give a compositional account, which leads to simple multi-agent generalizations. We also outline a general coalgebraic approach to the construction of assumption-complete models.

Related Topics
Physical Sciences and Engineering Computer Science Computational Theory and Mathematics
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