Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
435325 | Theoretical Computer Science | 2016 | 10 Pages |
Abstract
A cooperative (uniform) bin packing game is an N-person game, where the player set consists of k bins of capacity 1 each and n items of sizes a1,…,ana1,…,an. The value of a coalition of players is defined to be the maximum total size of items in the coalition that can be packed into the bins of the coalition. We aim at finding a multiplicative ϵ-core allocation with ϵ as small as possible, thus approximating the core as closely as possible. Our main result shows that the 1/4-core is nonempty for all instances of the uniform bin packing game.
Related Topics
Physical Sciences and Engineering
Computer Science
Computational Theory and Mathematics
Authors
Xian Qiu, Walter Kern,