Unconditional competitive auctions with copy and budget constraints

This paper investigates a new auction model in which bidders have both copy and budget constraints. This new model has extensive and interesting applications in auctions of online ad-words, software licenses, etc. We consider the following problem: Supposing all participators are rational, how does one allocate the objects and at what price so as to maximize the auctioneer’s revenue.We introduce new kinds of mechanisms called auctioneer-advantaged mechanisms and present the notion of unconditional competitive auctions. A notably interesting property of auctioneer-advantaged mechanisms is that each bidder’s self-interested strategy brings better utility not only to himself but also to the auctioneer. Then we present auctioneer-advantaged mechanisms for multi-unit auctions with copy and budget constraints. We prove that these auctions are unconditional competitive under the situation of both limited and unlimited supply.