Dual-rail transition logic: A logic style for counteracting power analysis attacks

In this paper, a new logic style is proposed to be used in the implementation of cryptographic algorithms. The aim of this approach is to counteract power analysis attacks. The proposed technique is based on the transition signaling. In dual-rail transition logic, one-bit value is transmitted by a transition on the proper signal of a couple of wires. According to this concept, converter units and logic gates are defined; it is proposed to use flip-flops to build DTL alternative parts. Although the usage of flip-flops leads to increase the required area, experimental results show that the power consumption of DTL circuits depends on unpredictable initial state of T-flip-flops. In other words, DTL randomizes the power consumption without using random number/mask generators while its delay time is reasonable in comparison with other logic styles. The difference of mean traces and the simulated attacks show that the power consumption of DTL gates does not correlate with the input/output values.