Collaborative jamming and collaborative defense in cognitive radio networks

In cognitive radio networks, cognitive nodes operate on a common pool of spectrum where they opportunistically access and use parts of the spectrum not being used by others. Though cooperation among nodes is desirable for efficient network operations and performance, there might be some malicious nodes whose objective could be to hinder communications and disrupt network operations. The absence of a central authority or any policy enforcement mechanism makes these kinds of open-access network more vulnerable and susceptible to attacks.In this paper, we analyze a common form of denial-of-service attack, i.e., collaborative jamming. We consider a network in which a group of jammers tries to jam the channels being used by legitimate users who in turn try to evade the jammed channels. First, we compute the distribution of the jamming signal that a node experiences by considering a random deployment of jammers. Then, we propose different jamming and defending schemes that are employed by the jammers and legitimate users, respectively. In particular, we model and analyze the channel availability when the legitimate users randomly choose available channels and the jammers jam different channels randomly. We propose a multi-tier proxy-based cooperative defense strategy to exploit the temporal and spatial diversity for the legitimate secondary users in an infrastructure-based centralized cognitive radio network. Illustrative results on spectrum availability rates show how to improve resiliency in cognitive radio networks in the presence of jammers.