Pricing and collecting decisions in a closed-loop supply chain with symmetric and asymmetric information

The optimal decision problem of a closed-loop supply chain with symmetric and asymmetric information structures is considered using game theory in this paper. The paper aims to explore how the manufacturer and the retailer make their own decisions about wholesale price, retail price, and collection rate under symmetric and asymmetric information conditions. Four game models are established, which allow one to examine the strategies of each firm and explore the role of the manufacturer and the retailer in four different game scenarios under symmetric and asymmetric information structures. The optimal strategies in closed form are given under the decision scenarios with symmetric information; moreover, the first order conditions that the optimal retail price, optimal wholesale price, and optimal collection rate satisfy are given under the decision scenarios with asymmetric information. The results obtained under symmetric and asymmetric information conditions and some key model parameters used in this paper are analyzed using a numerical approach by which some managerial analysis are given.