Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
477154 | European Journal of Operational Research | 2009 | 6 Pages |
Abstract
We consider a class of stochastic games, where each state is identified with a player. At any moment during play, one of the players is called active. The active player can terminate the game, or he can announce any player, who then becomes the active player. There is a non-negative payoff for each player upon termination of the game, which depends only on the player who decided to terminate. We give a combinatorial proof of the existence of subgame-perfect equilibria in pure strategies for the games in our class.
Related Topics
Physical Sciences and Engineering
Computer Science
Computer Science (General)
Authors
J. Kuipers, J. Flesch, G. Schoenmakers, K. Vrieze,