Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
477402 | European Journal of Operational Research | 2009 | 13 Pages |
Abstract
We study a mixed duopoly model, in which a state-owned (public) firm maximizing domestic social surplus and a private (foreign) firm compete. Under general enough assumptions, we first justify the concept of conjectural variations equilibrium (CVE) applied to the model by demonstrating concavity of the expected profit function of each agent. Next we establish existence and uniqueness results for the conjectural variations equilibrium in the described duopoly. A particular case of a CVE with constant influence (conjecture) coefficients is also examined.
Keywords
Related Topics
Physical Sciences and Engineering
Computer Science
Computer Science (General)
Authors
Vyacheslav Kalashnikov, Claudia Kemfert, Vitaly Kalashnikov,