Privacy and pricing personal information

The issues we address here are – How should a firm (e.g. Internet service provider (ISP)) that is capable of collecting personal information (browsing information, purchase history, etc.) about consumers, price its service, given that consumers vary in their valuation for privacy, and also vary in terms of the value of their personal information to a third party (firms that need consumer information)? Should the firm have a blanket policy of never collecting, or a policy of always collecting and revealing information? Surprisingly we find that in some cases the collector of information may be no worse off in the asymmetric information case than in the full information case. The paper provides a justification for the strategy of some firms such as ISP’s which never collect information and also for the strategy of other firms, like grocery stores that do. We also find that it is non-optimal for the firm to design contracts where the consumer can choose an intermediate level of privacy.