Stable network topologies using the notion of covering

An alternative perspective to evaluate networks and network evolution is introduced, based on the notion of covering. For a particular node in a network covering captures the idea of being outperformed by another node in terms of, for example, visibility and possibility of information gathering. In this paper, we focus on networks where these subdued network positions do not exist. We call these networks stable. Within this set we identify the minimal stable networks, which frequently have a ‘bubble-like’ structure. Severing a link in such a network results in at least one of the nodes being covered. In a minimal stable network therefore all nodes cooperate to avoid that one of the nodes ends up in a subdued position. Our results can be applied to, for example, the design of (covert) communication networks and the dynamics of social and information networks.

► An alternative perspective to evaluate networks and network evolution is introduced, based on the notion of covering. ► We identify a rich class of stable network structures. ► We examine the relation to game theoretic models of strategic network formation and stochastic actor based models. ► Our results are applied to the design of (covert) communication networks.