“Bricks vs. Clicks”: The impact of manufacturer encroachment with a dealer leasing and selling of durable goods

In durable goods markets, many brand name manufacturers, including IBM, HP, Epson, and Lenovo, have adopted dual-channel supply chains to market their products. There is scant literature, however, addressing the product durability and its impact on players’ optimal strategies in a dual-channel supply chain. To fill this void, we consider a two-period dual-channel model in which a manufacturer sells a durable product directly through both a manufacturer-owned e-channel and an independent dealer who adopts a mix of selling and leasing to consumers. Our results show that the manufacturer begins encroaching into the market in Period 1, but the dealer starts withdrawing from the retail channel in Period 2. Moreover, as the direct selling cost decreases, the equilibrium quantities and wholesale prices become quite angular and often nonmonotonic. Among other results, we find that both the dealer and the supply chain may benefit from the manufacturer’s encroachment. Our results also indicate that both the market structure and the nature of competition have an important impact on the player’s (dealer’s) optimal choice of leasing and selling.

► Our paper is the first to address the issue of marketing durables in dual channels. ► The manufacturer sells durables through an e-channel and an independent dealer. ► We allow the dealer to choose whether to lease or sell the durables to consumers. ► We find that the dealer and the supply chain may benefit from the encroachment. ► We show that the market structure has an important impact on Coase conjecture.