Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
478621 | European Journal of Operational Research | 2010 | 8 Pages |
Abstract
This paper introduces and analyzes a model of supervised work group where subordinates decide how to exert their effort in complementary tasks while the supervisors decide incentives. Incentives may be a combination of individual and group-based ones. The optimality of incentives is analyzed when considering two different cost functions for subordinates. The two cost functions describe different individual motivations; comparing the resulting effort allocations and production optimality, we can relate them to different organizational theories. Our results provide a measure of how motivation among subordinates may affect production and incentives. Furthermore, the optimal incentives schemes are examined in terms of Adams’ equity theory.
Related Topics
Physical Sciences and Engineering
Computer Science
Computer Science (General)
Authors
Arianna Dal Forno, Ugo Merlone,