Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
478694 | European Journal of Operational Research | 2010 | 13 Pages |
This study investigates whether a series of recent economic reforms on corporate governance influence the operational performance of Japanese manufacturing industries after the bubble economy. This study finds that stable shareholding is an important aspect of traditional Japanese corporate governance. Many Japanese corporate leaders still believe that the stable shareholders are important for their governance. However, the stable shareholding enhances their operational performance only when the ratio of shares held by stable shareholders is more than 61.21%. This result is inconsistent with the previous governance strategy of Japanese management. Moreover, the foreign investment enhances the operational performance of Japanese firms until the ratio of shares held by foreign shareholders becomes 19.49%. Japanese corporate leaders are very afraid of the foreign investment. This result is inconsistent with their opinions, as well. The second result indicates that Japanese firms need to accept more foreign investment and pay attention to the opinion of foreign investors. Finally, it is important for Japanese firms to make a balance between the traditional stable shareholding and the foreign investment.