Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
478716 | European Journal of Operational Research | 2010 | 10 Pages |
Abstract
In the context of minimum cost spanning tree problems, we present a bargaining mechanism for connecting all agents to the source and dividing the cost among them. The basic idea is very simple: we ask each agent the part of the cost he is willing to pay for an arc to be constructed. We prove that there exists a unique payoff allocation associated with the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of this bargaining mechanism. Moreover, this payoff allocation coincides with the rule defined in Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga [Bergantiños, G., Vidal-Puga, J.J., 2007a. A fair rule in minimum cost spanning tree problems. Journal of Economic Theory 137, 326–352].
Related Topics
Physical Sciences and Engineering
Computer Science
Computer Science (General)
Authors
Gustavo Bergantiños, Juan Vidal-Puga,