Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
481962 | European Journal of Operational Research | 2010 | 11 Pages |
Abstract
A bicooperative game is defined by a worth function on the set of ordered pairs of disjoint coalitions of players. The aim of this paper is to analyze the selectope for bicooperative games. This solution concept was introduced by Hammer et al. (1977) [20] and studied by Derks et al. (2000) [10] for cooperative games. We show the relations between the selectope, the core and the Weber set and obtain a characterization of almost positive bicooperative games as bicooperative games such that the core, the Weber set and the selectope coincide. Moreover, an axiomatic characterization of the elements of the selectope is obtained.
Related Topics
Physical Sciences and Engineering
Computer Science
Computer Science (General)
Authors
J.M. Bilbao, N. Jiménez, J.J. López,