Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
482056 | European Journal of Operational Research | 2007 | 16 Pages |
Abstract
We propose a game-theoretic model in which one national-brand manufacturer, acting as a leader, maximizes her own profit and one retailer, selling the national brand and her private label and acting as a follower, maximizes her category profit. We characterize the resulting Stackelberg equilibrium in terms of the amount of shelf space allocated to these brands as well as their prices. The results suggest that the allocation of the shelf space depends on the quality of the private label. In our framework, quality is measured by the baseline sales (or brand equity), the degree of brand substitution and the price positioning.
Related Topics
Physical Sciences and Engineering
Computer Science
Computer Science (General)
Authors
Nawel Amrouche, Georges Zaccour,