Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
4951201 | Journal of Computer and System Sciences | 2017 | 15 Pages |
Abstract
In this work, we investigate how to protect public key encryption from both key-leakage attacks and tampering attacks. First, we formalize the notions of chosen ciphertext (CCA) security against key-leakage and tampering attacks. To this goal, we then introduce the concept of key-homomorphic hash proof systems and present a generic construction of public key encryption based on this new primitive. Our construction, compared with previous works, realizes leakage-resilience and tampering-resilience simultaneously but completely independently, so it can tolerate a larger amount of bounded-memory leakage and be instantiated with more flexibility. Moreover, it allows for an unbounded number of affine-tampering queries, even after the challenge phase. With slight adaptations, our construction also achieves CCA security against subexponentially hard auxiliary-input leakage attacks and a polynomial of affine-tampering attacks. Thus, to the best of our knowledge, we get the first public key encryption scheme secure against both auxiliary-input leakage attacks and tampering attacks.
Related Topics
Physical Sciences and Engineering
Computer Science
Computational Theory and Mathematics
Authors
Shi-Feng Sun, Dawu Gu, Udaya Parampalli, Yu Yu, Baodong Qin,