Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
4956680 | Microprocessors and Microsystems | 2017 | 10 Pages |
Abstract
Many authors have shown how to break the AES cryptographic algorithm with side channel attacks; specially the timing attacks oriented to caches, like Prime+Probe. In this paper, we present two practical timing attacks on NoC that improve Prime+Probe technique, the P+P Firecracker, and P+P Arrow. Our attacks target the communication between an ARM Cortex-A9 core and a shared cache memory. Furthermore, we evaluate a secure enhanced NoC as a countermeasure against the timing attack. Finally, we demonstrate that attacks on MPSoCs through the NoC are a real threat and need to be further explored.
Keywords
Related Topics
Physical Sciences and Engineering
Computer Science
Computer Networks and Communications
Authors
Cezar Reinbrecht, Altamiro Susin, Lilian Bossuet, Georg Sigl, Johanna SepĂșlveda,