Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
5034775 | Journal of Economic Psychology | 2017 | 12 Pages |
Abstract
Studies of the principal-agent relationship find that monetary incentives work in many instances but that they can also backfire. Various mechanisms for this failure have been examined (e.g., intrinsic motivation, image concerns). We posit that an aversion to being exploited, i.e., being used instrumentally for another's benefit, can also cause incentives to fail. Using an experiment we find that compliance is lower for exploitative principals compared to neutral ones despite using the same contracts. To corroborate our results we show that surveyed “exploitation aversion” mediates this effect. Our results have implications for the design and implementation of incentives within organizations.
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Authors
Jeffrey Carpenter, David Dolifka,