Article ID Journal Published Year Pages File Type
5057697 Economics Letters 2017 4 Pages PDF
Abstract

•We study two-player strategic bargaining games with deterministic procedures.•We define a class of procedures called normalized procedures.•Each feasible payoff outcome can be implemented by a normalized procedure.•Different normalized procedures result in different payoff outcomes.

For a two-player bargaining model, Mao (2016) extends the alternating offers procedure of Rubinstein (1982) to more general procedures and explores which payoff outcomes are feasible, in the sense that they can be supported by some procedures as subgame perfect equilibria. In this paper, we define a special class of procedures called normalized procedures. We show that while the set of normalized procedures can yield all feasible partitions, none of its proper subsets can do so.

Related Topics
Social Sciences and Humanities Economics, Econometrics and Finance Economics and Econometrics
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