| Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5058802 | Economics Letters | 2015 | 5 Pages |
â¢The equivalence between the pairwise-stability and the setwise-stability is obtained.â¢We show that the pairwise-stability implies the strong corewise-stability.â¢We show that the strong core may be a proper subset of the core.â¢We show that the deferred acceptance algorithm yields a pairwise-stable matching.
This paper investigates the two-sided many-to-many matching problem, where every agent has max-min preference. The equivalence between the pairwise-stability and the setwise-stability is obtained. It is shown that the pairwise-stability implies the strong corewise-stability and the former may be strictly stronger than the latter. We also show that the strong core may be a proper subset of the core. The deferred acceptance algorithm yields a pairwise-stable matching. Thus the set of stable matchings (in all four senses) is non-empty.
