Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
5059810 | Economics Letters | 2013 | 4 Pages |
Abstract
This article proposes a simple Nash program. Both our axiomatic characterization and our noncooperative procedure consider each distinct asymmetric and symmetric Nash solution. Our noncooperative procedure is a generalization of the simplest known sequential Nash demand game analyzed by Rubinstein et al. (1992). We then provide the simplest known axiomatic characterization of the class of asymmetric Nash solutions, in which we use only Nash's crucial Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives axiom and an asymmetric modification of the well-known Midpoint Domination axiom.
Related Topics
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Authors
Nejat Anbarci, Ching-jen Sun,