Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
5071449 | Games and Economic Behavior | 2016 | 20 Pages |
Abstract
We provide a new perspective on how to operate matching markets when there are many types of markets. Our finding is that the market-wise adaptation of strategy-proof and non-wasteful rules yields a strategy-proof rule with the following efficiency property: no strategy-proof rule Pareto-dominates the rule. Such rules are abundant as they include the market-wise use of the well-known priority-based rules of the top trading cycles and the deferred acceptance. This result gives theoretical support to the independent operation of markets observed in real-life markets as well as our practice in Market Design that separately treats each market for its design.
Related Topics
Social Sciences and Humanities
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Economics and Econometrics
Authors
Hidekazu Anno, Morimitsu Kurino,