Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
5071491 | Games and Economic Behavior | 2016 | 12 Pages |
Abstract
Blackwell (1951, 1953) proposes an informativeness ranking of experiments: experiment I is more Blackwell-informative than experiment II if and only if the value of experiment I is higher than that of experiment II for all expected-utility maximizers. Under commitment and reduction, our main theorem shows that Blackwell equivalence holds for all convex and strongly monotone preferences-i.e., uncertainty-averse preferences (Cerreia-Vioglio et al., 2011b), which nest most ambiguity-averse preferences commonly used in applications as special cases.
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Authors
Jian Li, Junjie Zhou,