Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
5071698 | Games and Economic Behavior | 2014 | 13 Pages |
Abstract
A group of heterogeneous agents may form partnerships in pairs. All single agents as well as all partnerships generate values. If two agents choose to cooperate, they need to specify how to split their joint value among one another. In equilibrium, which may or may not exist, no agents have incentives to break up any existing partnerships or form new partnerships. This paper proposes a dynamic competitive adjustment process that always either finds an equilibrium or exclusively disproves the existence of any equilibrium in finitely many steps. When an equilibrium exists, partnership and revenue distribution will be automatically and endogenously determined by the process. Moreover, several fundamental properties of the equilibrium solution and the model are derived.
Related Topics
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Economics and Econometrics
Authors
Tommy Andersson, Jens Gudmundsson, Dolf Talman, Zaifu Yang,