Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
5071708 | Games and Economic Behavior | 2014 | 9 Pages |
Abstract
We prove a folk theorem for stochastic games with private, almost-perfect monitoring and observable states when the limit set of feasible and individually rational payoffs is independent of the state. This asymptotic state independence holds, for example, for irreducible stochastic games. Our result establishes that the sophisticated construction of Hörner and Olszewski (2006) for repeated games can be adapted to stochastic games, reinforcing our conviction that much knowledge and intuition about repeated games carries over to the analysis of irreducible stochastic games.
Related Topics
Social Sciences and Humanities
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Economics and Econometrics
Authors
Katsuhiko Aiba,