Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
5071780 | Games and Economic Behavior | 2013 | 24 Pages |
Abstract
We analyze a toy class of two-player repeated games with two-sided incomplete information. In our model, two players are facing independent decision problems and each of them holds information that is potentially valuable to the other player. We study to what extent, and how, information can be exchanged at equilibrium. We show that, provided oneʼs initial information is valuable to the other player, equilibria exist at which an arbitrary amount of information is exchanged at an arbitrary high rate. The construction relies on an indefinite, reciprocated, exchange.
Related Topics
Social Sciences and Humanities
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Economics and Econometrics
Authors
Dinah Rosenberg, Eilon Solan, Nicolas Vieille,