Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
5071808 | Games and Economic Behavior | 2013 | 10 Pages |
Abstract
â¢We define strategic discontinuity for types.â¢It generalizes Rubinsteinʼs e-mail-game argument.â¢Most economic types display strategic discontinuity in simple games.â¢Some types display strategic discontinuity only in complicated games.
The e-mail game in Rubinstein (1989) shows that types with arbitrarily close higher-order beliefs may differ substantially in strategic behaviors. We define a notion called strategic discontinuity in arbitrary incomplete-information scenarios to generalize this e-mail game phenomenon. We show that almost all types involved in economic analysis - types in finite or common-prior models - display strategic discontinuity in simple games.
Related Topics
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Authors
Yi-Chun Chen, Siyang Xiong,